The "Right" Hitting/Pitching Splits

In my last two posts, I've discussed how a difference in hitting/pitching splits can vastly change your auction.

Less understood is the concept of where these hitting/pitching splits come from and why we don't spend $130 for our hitters and $130 for our pitchers. There are two answers to this question. The first answer is theoretical, the second is pragmatic.

The theoretical answer is that hitters produce positive gains in three categories while pitchers only produce positive gains in two categories. That is to say, once a hitter hits a HR, drives in a run, or steals a base, no event on the field can steal that statistic away from you. Batting average doesn't work this way. If a hitter goes 0-5, you lose all the ground you picked up the night before when he went 2-5 and are actually behind the eight-ball, since a .200 BA will put you in last place.

When Alex Patton devised his system of pricing, he theorized that there are 14 hitters who produce permanent gains in three categories (HR, RBI, SB) and 9 pitchers who produce permanent gains in two categories (wins, saves). Therefore, you have 42 opportunities (14 x 3) to gain in hitting versus only 18 (9 x 2) in pitching. Hitters, therefore, were worth 70% (42/60) of the pie, or $182 per team.

With the advent of 5x5, hitters could now derive permanent gains in four categories while pitchers could do so in three categories. As a result, pitchers were worth more, but not much more, since hitters provided 56 opportunities for gain (14 x 4) while pitchers only provided 27 opportunities (9 x 3). Hitters, therefore, were worth 67.5% of the pie, or about $175 per team.

That's the theory behind the pricing.

From a practical standpoint, leagues in the old days used to spend much more than $78 or $85 per team on pitching. The teams that spent less than that generally tended to clean up in the standings. Markets emulate success, so the prices for pitching dropped and dropped until they dropped to about $85 per team in 4x4. Leagues on the whole, however, couldn't bring themselves to pay as little as 30% for their pitching staffs.

Last year, both LABR and Tout Wars nearly did. LABR paid 31% of its budget for pitching, while Tout Wars paid 30.2%, or nearly $78 per team. Ironically, both LABR and Tout Wars use the 5x5 format so, in theory, they should actually be paying a little more, not a little less, or pitching.

What really drives these differences?

Predictability is the main factor. If you pay $20 for a hitter and he tanks, you're still going to get slight contributions in HR/RBI and maybe SB, while only taking a mild hit in batting average. Odds are, your $20 investment will still be worth $5. You can't afford to take too many hits like this, of course, but one bad hitter won't entirely capsize your offense.

Pitchers are different. A $20 pitcher who tanks might very well put up a 5.2 ERA with a 1.5 WHIP and destroy you in both those categories. You'll need a pitcher with a 3.5 ERA and a 1.2 WHIP just to get back to league average.

That's why we don't pay for pitching as a practical matter. We pay more than $9 for our pitching staffs because we need to make innings, and a $10 investment gives us more control and better odds of a positive return on our pitching investments. But we don't pay much more than $80 or so per team because we know that this year's $20 buy could turn into a negative earner who ruins our entire season.